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Issue I

COURTREPORTS

executed at a time prior to "headwater benefits" being thought of or
even termed.
Finally, FERC argued that the 1872 Deed could not have
transferred Menasha dam's "waterpower" rights because such rights
belonged to that dam's private owners in 1855. Hence, FERC
contended the Canal Company could not have conveyed what it did
not own. The court agreed that the Canal Company did not own any
"waterpower" rights at the Menasha dam. However, the court upheld
the Hydropower Operators argument that the Menasha dam's release
of stored water created additional power potential at their downstream
hydropower projects and such energy belonged to them. The court
declared that the 1872 Deed reserved an increased "waterpower"
enhancement for the Canal Company. Accordingly, the court held
that the Hydropower Operators already owned the "waterpower"
rights, thus making FERC's argument regarding the Menasha dam's
"waterpower" ownership rights unreasonable.
The court vacated FERC's Order on Rehearing and remanded the
case for the entry of an order consistent with the opinion.
SaraFranklin
United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding the
federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
Environmental Protection Agency's case based on Krilich's violation of
a federal statute).
Robert Krilich ("Krilich") was the developer of the Royce
Renaissance Property in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois.
The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") charged Krilich with
violating section 301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for
discharging fill into a wetland without first obtaining a section 404
permit. To settle the dispute, Krilich entered into a consent decree
with EPA. The consent decree required that Krilich pay a fine of
$185,000, remediate some of the filled wetland, and build a 3.1 acre
replacement wetland on the development property. The consent
decree included a penalty provision for any delay in completing the
replacement wetland.
Upon Krilich's failure to complete the substitute wetland by the
date specified in the consent decree, EPA moved to enforce the
penalty provision. The district court granted EPA's motion and fined
Krilich $1,307,500.
Krilich appealed the district court judgment
arguing that the deadlines had been modified, the doctrines of
impossibility and frustration excused his non-performance, and the
government was equitably estopped from enforcing the penalty
provisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment but remanded
the case to correct an error made in calculating the amount of the
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penalty. On remand, Krilich filed a Rule 60(b) (4) motion to vacate
the judgment as void because the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over EPA's complaint. The district court denied the
motion and Krilich appealed.
On appeal, Krilich argued that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the wetland he allegedly filled was an
"isolated intrastate wetland" and was not part of the "waters of the
United States" within the meaning of the CWA. Krilich argued that
the "isolated intrastate wetland" was beyond the federal government's
commerce power to regulate, and therefore the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over EPA's complaint. In addition, Krilich
contended the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction despite
the fact he had agreed in the consent decree that the wetland he filled
was part of the "waters of the United States."
The court held that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over EPA's case against Krilich because EPA civilly charged
him with violating a federal statute, which was within the federal
courts' federal question jurisdiction. In reaching its holding, the court
stated Krilich confused the meaning of the term 'jurisdiction." The
court stated the interstate commerce power to regulate "waters of the
United States" did not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court to hear the case. Rather, the issue of whether the
wetland Krilich filled was within Congress's interstate commerce power
to regulate was an element of the offense itself. Krilich's violation of
the CWA triggered the district court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Krilich's 60(b) (4) motion
to bar enforcement of the penalty.
JulieE. Hultgren

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Sokol v. Kennedy, 210 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding the National
Park Service's identification and application of the "significant and
important" values criteria rather than the "outstandingly remarkable"
values criteria to determine and set boundaries for protected river area
violated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and that the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act does not require physical demarcation of protected river
boundaries).
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("Act") protects portions of certain
rivers determined to possess, along with their immediate surrounding
environments, "outstandingly remarkable" values. Pursuant to a 1991
amendment to the Act, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior
to select boundaries along Nebraska's Niobrara River ("River") for
protection under the terms of the Act. The Secretary of the Interior

